Investors who were already at the negotiating table before the measures now have a clearer framework; those who arrive later will find a landscape that has already been partially explored.
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In the months leading up to the approval of the package of 176 transformations, AUGE observed a movement that, while discreet, was revealing: several foreign investors to whom Cuba owed significant outstanding debts were already in advanced stages of negotiation to convert those unpaid credits into rights to operate production facilities or assets linked to the tourism sector.
Cuba’s external debt to the Paris Club had risen to $4.795 billion by the end of 2025, and the government had acknowledged to its creditors that it was impossible to meet the agreed-upon payment schedules. The debt-for-asset swap mechanism—exchanging debt for a stake in or the right to use state assets—had been proposed by President Díaz-Canel himself as a way to alleviate financial pressure without transferring permanent ownership of the assets.
To a large extent, the regulatory package of June 2026 establishes a legal framework for practices that were already being discussed or taking place. The measures—extending surface rights to up to 99 years, allowing foreign investment in private companies, and simplifying approval processes—are not merely a gesture of openness; they are a response to the Cuban government’s concrete need to monetize assets to meet its financial obligations, amidst a tightened embargo and an energy crisis that has paralyzed much of the country’s productive infrastructure.
For international investors, this presents a dual perspective. On one hand, the regulatory package confirms the government’s willingness to negotiate and offer tangible assets in exchange. On the other, it reveals that Cuba’s financial urgency is such that negotiation terms may prove more favorable to investors than they would be under less pressured circumstances.
Investors who were already at the negotiating table prior to these measures now have a clearer framework; those arriving later will find a landscape that has already been partially explored. However, there is also a caveat: the fact that the government is willing to swap assets for debt does not mean those assets are in optimal operating condition. The energy crisis, shortages of inputs, and infrastructure deterioration are problems the investor will have to shoulder.
An investor who has never operated in Cuba before and evaluates this package from the outside will find few incentives to take the plunge. U.S. sanctions remain in place and have even been reinforced by specific designations affecting key sectors. Meanwhile, the energy crisis is far from a minor issue; it paralyzes a significant portion of the country’s productive infrastructure, rendering any project requiring operational continuity unviable. In this context, the 176 measures may signal openness, but they do not guarantee viability.
What is changing (concrete signals)
Despite the challenging environment, the package includes changes that are significant for certain types of investors. Here are the five key signals:
1- End of the state monopoly as the sole partner. Until now, the primary avenues for investing in Cuba were partnering with state-owned enterprises or establishing wholly foreign-owned companies—a practice that was not particularly encouraged even in the past. That requirement has been eliminated. Foreign investors can now choose to set up a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary, make a direct investment in a private Cuban company, or maintain the joint-venture model if they deem it appropriate.
This flexibility does not emerge from a vacuum; since the advent of MSMEs in 2021, the Cuban private sector had already become a silent yet increasingly important partner for foreign investors operating in the country. They acted not as capital partners, but as clients filling the gap left by the state sector’s dwindling import capacity—a decline driven by a lack of foreign currency and embargo-related restrictions. They also served as providers of after-sales services for foreign subsidiaries’ end customers, as equipment installers and maintenance technicians, exclusive distributors, and logistics partners, among other collaborative arrangements that developed in practice, outside the formal legal framework. The new regulatory package recognizes and provides a legal basis for this pre-existing relationship, paving the way for such collaboration to deepen and become formalized. Flexibility is real, but it brings a challenge: the quality of Cuban private partners varies widely. Investors choosing the private route must conduct rigorous due diligence.
2. Direct hiring. The mandatory use of employment agencies to select and hire staff for foreign investment, branches, and representative offices is eliminated. This represents a significant change in human capital management, although the ability to find qualified personnel remains a challenge.
3. Access to assets and property. For the first time, foreign investors —including Cubans living abroad— can acquire shares of state-owned companies and purchase property. Surface rights are extended to 99 years and usufruct rights to 50 years. The approval process has been simplified.
4. Administrative simplification. The documentation and deadlines for approving foreign investment projects are reduced. The principle of “positive administrative silence” will be applied in licensing processes. It is an improvement, but it depends on the capacity of public institutions to deliver.
5. Financial reordering. Private banking, exchange houses, foreign currency accounts without prior authorization, and a digital exchange market with auctions are authorized. This is a significant step forward, but Cuba’s financial system starts from a deeply deteriorated technological and trust base. Investors with complex financing needs or international treasury management must assess whether the new framework is sufficient or if alternative structures are needed.
6. Foreign trade and dollarization. Private companies and cooperatives are now allowed to export and import directly, with a negative list. Partial dollarization of inter-company operations is expanded. For an investor, this reduces exchange rate risk in current transactions, but access to foreign currency for profit repatriation still depends on the evolution of the digital exchange market, whose liquidity is uncertain.
An opportunity for those already here
For investors already present in Cuba, the reading is different. They know how to operate on the ground, understand the unwritten rules, have built relationships, and have learned to manage the risk of being in Cuba in the face of sanctions. For them, the regulatory package can be a formidable opportunity: it gives them a clearer framework to expand their participation, access new assets, and negotiate conditions that were not available before.
Sanctions, for their part, create a protective dome: the large investors who could compete with them hesitate to enter, and those already in place can decide to move forward while others wait, gaining time and advantage. However, since the executive order of May 2026, it has become increasingly difficult to operate without exposure to secondary sanctions risk, and caution remains the rule.
What we have seen in practice
In our experience accompanying foreign investors and branches present in the country, we have observed a change that may be as significant as the measures themselves: the government is now more open to discussing, listening to, and considering proposals that just ten years ago were unthinkable and, at the time, would not have even sparked a conversation.
It is not an ideological opening, but a practical realization that the previous model could not sustain the country’s financial needs. This does not mean negotiations are easy or fast —they remain complex and require patience— but the willingness to engage in dialogue on previously unacceptable schemes is real and, for the investor already on the ground, represents an asset that newcomers do not have.
The package of 176 transformations is not just an invitation to new investors; it is a signal to those already in the market or to those with a high tolerance for risk. For first-time investors, the context of reinforced sanctions and energy crisis makes the risk-return equation still unfavorable. Waiting for the environment to improve is not a bad strategy; it is a prudent one.
For investors who have already spent time in Cuba, it is the moment to maximize the time invested, the risks and difficulties faced, and to try to move forward with confidence.
